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Abstract Cloud computing helps reduce costs, increase
business agility and deploy solutions with a high return
on investment for many types of applications. However,
data security is of premium importance to many users
and often restrains their adoption of cloud technologies.
Various approaches, i.e., data encryption, anonymiza-
tion, replication and verification, help enforce differ-
ent facets of data security. Secret sharing is a particu-
larly interesting cryptographic technique. Its most ad-
vanced variants indeed simultaneously enforce data pri-
vacy, availability and integrity, while allowing compu-
tation on encrypted data. The aim of this paper is thus
to wholly survey secret sharing schemes with respect to
data security, data access and costs in the pay-as-you-
go paradigm.
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1 Introduction
Cloud computing is currently booming, with companies
of all sizes adopting associated technologies to benefit
from resource and cost elasticity. However, data secu-
rity remains one of the top concerns for cloud users
and would-be users. Security issues, both inherited from
classical distributed architectures and specific to the
new framework of the cloud, are indeed numerous, es-
pecially at the data storage level of public clouds [22].
Critical security concerns in cloud storage are de-
picted in Figure 1, which highlights the major issues in
cloud data security, i.e., data privacy, availability and
integrity. In particular, cloud architectures might not
be sufficiently safeguarded from inside attacks. In vir-
tual environments, a malicious user might be able to
break into ”neighboring” virtual machines located on
the same hardware, and then steal, modify or delete the
other users’ data [57,2,29,56,104,102,47]. In such envi-
ronments, users are indeed usually granted with supe-
ruser access for managing their virtual machines. A ma-
licious superuser can access real network components
and thus launch attacks [2,11]. Moreover, virtualization
allows the rollback of a virtual machine to some previ-
ous state if necessary. Although this rollback feature
provides flexibility to the users, it can also revert the
virtual machine to previous security policies and config-
uration control [2,47]. Eventually, virtual machine mi-
gration is run to improve quality of service. During such
migration processes, which typically do not shut down
services, virtual machine contents are exposed to the
network, and problems such as network transfer bottle-
necks and data damage may occur [2,47,97].
Classical data security approaches, i.e., data encryp-
tion [9,39], data anonymization [24], replication [69],
data verification [87], data separation [96,68,103] and
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Fig. 1: Data security issues in the cloud
differential privacy [34], can solve most data security is-
sues within cloud computing environments (Figure 2),
but usually one at a time. Many data-centric cloud ap-
plications do not only require data to be secure, but
also efficiently accessed, sometimes through complex,
analytical queries akin to on-line analysis processing
(OLAP) operations. With users seeking to reduce costs
in the cloud’s pay-as-you-go pricing model, achieving
the best tradeoff between data security and access power
and efficiency is a great challenge [22,81].
Data
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Fig. 2: Features of data security approaches
Existing surveys about distributed data security list
security services in distributed storage: authentication
and authorization, availability, confidentiality and in-
tegrity, key sharing and management, auditing and in-
trusion detection, and finally useability, manageability
and performance [58,29]. Then, network file systems,
cryptographic file systems and storage intrusion detec-
tion systems are discussed and compared. This pre-
cloud review is complemented by a thorough compar-
ison of storage-centric data protection (i.e., network
storage devices) in user-centric data protection systems
(i.e., cryptographic storage systems and cloud-based
storage) [93,29]. Finally, [91,29] provide a short overview
of what should be done in terms of data auditing and
encryption in the cloud.
Although these surveys do mention secret sharing,
they provide few details about this particular cryp-
tographic technique, which was simultaneously intro-
duced by Shamir [76] and Blakley [12] in 1979 and can
be particularly useful nowadays in the context of cloud
computing, e.g., to safely manage and analyze big data.
Threshold secret sharing schemes indeed transform sen-
sitive data into individually meaningless data pieces
(called shares) that are distributed to n participants
akin to CSPs. Computations can then be performed
onto shares, but yield meaningless individual results.
The global result can only be reconstructed knowing
individual results from several participants (more than
threshold t ≤ n). Moreover, some secret sharing vari-
ants simultaneously enforce data privacy, availability
and integrity, which no other security scheme achieves.
Eventually, secret sharing can be used by both CSPs,
with data being shared within their cloud infrastruc-
ture, and users, who can dispatch sensitive data over
several providers. Since some secret sharing schemes
also support homomorphism, they allow data analysis
on shares, thus allowing data access cost optimization.
To the best of our knowledge, secret sharing schemes
(SSSs) up to 2008 have only been surveyed with re-
spect to bounds on share size and global data volume
[8]. In this paper, we also include the most recent SSSs
and complement [8] by analyzing the objectives of each
SSS, the security and data analysis features a user can
expect, and the costs implied in a cloud computing en-
vironment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows (Figure 3). Section 2 describes the principles of
secret sharing and classifies SSSs into eleven groups,
whose properties are thoroughly detailed. SSSs in a
given group are also positioned with respect to one an-
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Fig. 3: Schematic map of the paper
other. In Section 3, we compare all surveyed SSSs with
respect to data security, queries over shares, and storage
and computing costs. Moreover, we present SSS-based
frameworks that provide secure storage, e.g., databases
or data warehouses, in the cloud in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 concludes this paper, recaps open research
issues and describes sample applications in the cloud.
2 Secret Sharing Schemes
The threshold SSSs we survey in this paper are primar-
ily aimed at enforcing privacy. Individual secret d is di-
vided into n so-called shares {ei}i=0,··· ,n, each share ei
being stored by a different participant (PT) PTi (Fig-
ure 4(a)). Each share ei is meaningless to PTi. A sub-
set of t ≤ n PTs is required to reconstruct the secret
(Figure 4(b)). Thence, a convenient side effect of SSSs
is data availability, since up to n − t PTs may disap-
pear without preventing secret reconstruction. Classical
SSSs [76,12,3,49,54,71,46,72,61] mainly differ in shar-
ing methods, which bear different security properties
with different data storage and CPU requirements.
A major drawback of initial SSSs is the multipli-
cation of the initial data volume by the number of
PTs. Multi secret sharing schemes (MSSSs) thus aim
to reduce computation, storage and data transfer costs
by sharing and reconstructing more than one secret at
once. Some MSSSs achieve an overall shared data vol-
ume (i.e., at all PTs’) that is close to that of original
secret data. We categorize MSSSs into two types.
In MSSSs type I [94,90], data are shared with the
help of keys. m secrets {dj}j=1,··· ,m and n keys
{ki}i=1,··· ,n are used to construct x shares {ch}h=1,··· ,x,
where m ≤ x. Shares are stored in a news bulletin
board (NB), whereas each key ki is stored at PTi (Fig-
ure 5(a)). To reconstruct the m secrets, all or some
(depending on the MSSS) shares and t keys are used
(Figure 5(b)).
In MSSSs type II [18,75,61,83], m secrets
{dj}j=1,··· ,m are divided into n shares {ei}i=1,··· ,n, where
m ≤ t ≤ n. In case m > t, secrets are first organized
(t, n) SSS
d Data owner
e1 e2 en...
PT1 PT2 PTn
(a) Sharing process
(t, n) SSS
d Data owner
e1 e2 en...
PT1 PT2 PTn
select t from n
(b) Reconstruction process
Fig. 4: Classical secret sharing
into blocks that are fewer than t. Then, each block is
divided into n shares at once. Finally each share ei is
stored by PTi (Figure 6(a)). As in SSSs, reconstructing
the secrets requires t PTs (Figure 6(b)).
SSSs and MSSSs assume that all players, i.e., PTs
and NB, are honest and always provide valid informa-
tion (data and keys). However, in reality, they might
not, intentionally or not. Thus, verifiable secret sharing
schemes (VSSSs) [73,23,77,53,98] and verifiable multi
secret sharing schemes (VMSSSs) [37,99,27,28,89,38,
20,60,52,82,19,78,21,25,16,6,5,80] verify the correct-
ness of data and/or keys before or after reconstruction.
Therefore, VSSSs and VMSSSs enforce data integrity
in addition to privacy and availability.
Eventually, some SSSs aim at specic goals. Proac-
tive secret sharing schemes (PSSSs) are based on clas-
sical SSSs or VSSSs but, in addition, periodically re-
fresh shares [51,17,92,101,7,31,62]. Refreshing consists
in generating a random number at each PT’s and shar-
ing it at all other PTs’ to modify existing shares. ln
most PSSSs [51,92,7,31,62,62], refreshing is synchronous,
i.e., shares cannot be reconstructed during the process,
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Fig. 5: Multiple secret sharing type I
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Fig. 6: Multiple secret sharing type II
but there are also asynchronous refreshing protocols
[17,101] that allow share reconstruction at all times.
All PSSSs include a share verification process that ver-
ifies whether shares are up-to-date when refreshing. If
shares are obsolete, they may be safely deleted or re-
covered from other shares. Since shares are periodically
refreshed even if secrets have not been updated, an in-
truder has little time to compromise them.
However, the refreshing process in PSSSs induces
extra costs, i.e., computing costs for periodically shar-
ing random numbers among PTs and modifying shares
(time complexity is O(mn2) [51]); and high communi-
cation costs for commuting PTs with each other, whose
cost is at least n times that of sharing secrets. Because
of these costs, and since PSSSs reuse the data sharing
and reconstruction processes of the classical SSSs that
are detailed in this section, we do not survey PSSSs
further.
Weighted secret sharing schemes (WSSSs) extend
classical SSSs by introducing a priority among PTs by
assigning to each PT a weight, i.e., the number of shares
it stores [10,64,45,33]. More precisely, in these schemes,
any secret d is divided into w shares such that w ≥ n.
Each PTi holds wi shares such that w =
∑n
i=1 wi. If
n = w or wi = 1 ∀i, we fall back to a classical SSS.
Secret reconstruction is only possible by a group of PTs
holding at least t shares, with wi < t ≤ w ∀i. One single
PT cannot reconstruct the secret, since wi < t ∀i.
Social secret sharing schemes (SSSSs) extend from
WSSSs by allowing weights to be adjusted depending on
the situation, e.g., if some PTs are found insincere [67,
66,100,65] . Even though WSSSs and SSSSs bring in
a more flexible PT management, they induce a higher
share volume, i.e., at least n times the original data
volume vs. at most n times for previous SSSs, suppos-
ing that individual shares use up the same volume as
secrets. Thus, we do not survey them further.
Finally, function secret sharing schemes (FSSSs) [14,
59,15] aim at protecting data transfers over networks
when keyword search is performed on outsourced, repli-
cated data. A function f is shared into n functions
f1, · · · , fn such that f =
∑n
i=1 fi. Each function fi
is associated with a data node akin to a participant
PTi in classical secret sharing. When the user issues a
search query with some keyword k, fi(k) is sent to PTi
∀i = 1 · · ·n. Then data at each PTi are matched with
fi(k). The local result Ri is shared as fi(Ri) and sent
back to the user, who can finally reconstruct a global
result with t ≤ n values of fi(Ri). However, FSSSs do
not fit in our data outsourcing scenario since data are
replicated in clear form. Thus, we do not survey them
further. Yet, FSSSs are quite recent and hybridizing
them with other SSSs surveyed in this section could
help solve this issue.
We categorize SSSs into eleven groups (Table 1)
with respect to their basic type, i.e., SSSs and MSSSs
types I and II, as well as eventual data or key verifica-
tion. We survey all groups in the following subsections.
Moreover, we introduce the parameters and notations
used throughout this section in Table 2.
2.1 Group 1: Classical Secret Sharing Schemes
The very first (t, n) SSS [76] enforces data security by
using a random polynomial (Equation 1). This polyno-
mial is generated over a finite field such that coefficient
c0 is the secret and other coefficients cu=1,··· ,t−1 are ran-
Secret Sharing for Cloud Data Security 5
Table 1: Classification of secret sharing schemes
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& [98] [82,19,78] [80]
keys [21,25,16]
dom integers. Then, each share ei is created by Equa-
tion 2 and stored at PTi. A number t ≤ n of PTs can
reconstruct the original polynomial by Lagrange inter-
polation over a finite field, which enforces data avail-
ability even if n − t PTs fail. A sample application
of this scheme is given in Figure 7, where t = 4 and
n = 6. The random polynomial of degree t − 1 = 3 is
ei = f(i) = i
3 − 5i2 + 2i+ 4, where 4 is the secret. The
six shares {(i, ei)}i=1,··· ,6 (plotted in blue) are (1,2),
(2,-4), (3,-8), (4,-4), (5,14) and (6,52).
f(i) =
t−1∑
u=0
cu × iu (1)
ei = f(i) (2)
i
f(i)
1 2 3 4 5 6
-10
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40
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60
y = f (x) = x3 − 5x2 + 2x+ 4
d = 4. . . . .
.
.
Fig. 7: Secret sharing by polynomial interpolation
In Blakley’s SSS [12], each PT is associated with an
hyperplane in a t-dimensional space over a finite field.
Hyperplanes, i.e., shares, intersect in a point that is
the secret, which can be reconstructed by solving the
hyperplanes’ equation system. A sample application of
this scheme is given in Figure 8, where t = 2 and n = 3
(there are thus three hyperplans).
Table 2: Secret sharing schemes’ parameters
Parameter Definition
m Number of secrets
D Secret data such that D = {d1, · · · , dm}
and D = {b1, · · · , bo}
d Secret in integer format
‖d‖ Storage size of d
dj jth element of D in integer format
n Number of PTs
t Number of shares necessary for recon-
structing the secret
γ Number of PTs of the first group in [83]
PTi PT number i
IDi Identifier of PTi
g Number of groups of PTs
Gr rth group of PTs such that
Gr ⊆ {PTi}i=1,··· ,n and
Gr = {PTr,1, · · · , PTr,g}
PTr,v PT number v of Gr
IDr,v Identifier of PTr,v of Gr
o Number of data blocks
bl lth block of D such that bl =
{dl,1, · · · , dl,t} with fixed-sized blocks
and bl = {dl,1, · · · , dl,tl} with variable-
sized blocks
tl Number of shares necessary for recon-
structing the secret in bl (in case of
variable-sized blocks)
dl,q qth element of bl in integer format
ei Share stored at PTi
ej,i jth share stored at PTi
el,i Share of bl stored at PTi
ch hth share stored at the NB
cj,h hth share of dj stored at the NB
cl,h hth share of bl stored at the NB
cl,q,h hth share of dl,q in bl stored at the NB
cr,l,h hth share of bl from Gr stored at the
NB
ki Key stored at PTi
ki,q Key number q stored at PTi
kr,i Key stored at PTi of Gr
‖k‖ Storage size of keys
s di Signature stored at PTi
s dl Signature of dl
s dl,i Signature of bl stored at PTi
s dl,q Signature number q of bl
s ki Signature of PTi’s key
s kr,v Signature of PTr,v’s key of Gr
‖s‖ Storage size of signatures
p, p1, p2 . . . Big prime numbers
A,A1, A2 . . . Matrices
f, f1, f2 . . . Functions
H,H1, H2 . . . Hash functions
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from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret sharing
Fig. 8: Secret sharing through hyperplan intersection
[3] exploits the Chinese remainder theorem [30]. First,
n+1 uniquely relatively primes1 {pi}i=0,··· ,n are deter-
mined such that p0 < p1 < · · · < pn and
∏t
i=1 pi >
p0
∏t−1
i=1 pn−i+1. Then, n shares {el}l=1,··· ,n are created
by Equations 3 and 4, where u is a random positive
integer. Finally, secret d is reconstructed from t shares
by Equations 5 and 6.
ei = y mod pi (3)
y = d+ u× p0 (4)
d = y mod p0 (5)
y ≡ ei mod mi (6)
All subsequent SSSs extend the three foundation
schemes above. [54] extends from [3] to reduce the size
of shares. Moreover, this SSS can reconstruct a secret
from t or more shares, whereas previous schemes ex-
ploit exactly t shares. In the sharing process, the secret
is split in t. Share creation from the t splits and secret
reconstruction proceed as in [3]. All other SSSs seek to
improve polynomial interpolation.
[71] proceeds in two steps. First, secret d is divided
into t intermediate shares {uv}v=1,··· ,t by mapping d
to the x-axis of a random polynomial. Second, these t
shares are divided again into n actual shares {ei}i=1,··· ,t
by Equation 7, where A1 is an n × t random matrix.
Secret d is reconstructed from a polynomial of degree
t created by Equation 8. {uv}v=1,··· ,t are reconstructed
by Equation 9, where A2 is a t×t inverse matrix seeded
from t rows of matrix A1.
[e1, · · · , en]T = A1 × [u1, · · · , ut]T (7)
t∏
a=1
(x− ua) ≡ 0 mod p (8)
[u1, · · · , ut]T = A2 × [e1, · · · , et]T (9)
The second step enforces availability and is optional.
A sample application of the first step is given in Fig-
ure 9, where d = 10 and t = 3. The polynomial equa-
tion of degree 3 (x−u1)(x−u2)(x−u3) ≡ x3− 21x2 +
1 Uniquely relatively primes are random prime numbers
that are related to each other by some conditions.
x − 10 ≡ 0 mod 31 is created with the help of prime
p = 31 and random positive integers u1 = 19, u2 = 22
and u3 = 11, where u1, u2, u3 match with condition
u3 ≡ d× (u1 × u2) mod p.
x
f(x)
p
d
u1. u2.u3.
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Fig. 9: [71]’s secret mapping step
In [72], a secret d is split into t−1 smaller data units
{uv}v=1,··· ,t−1 to reduce global share volume. Then, a
polynomial equation of degree t−1 is created by running
recursive functions t− 1 times (Equation 10, where y is
a random integer) to improve security. Next, n shares
{ei}i=1,··· ,n are created by Equation 11. Finally, data
are reconstructed through t − 1 steps by Lagrange in-
terpolation.
fv(x) =
{
uv + y × x if v = 1
uv +
∑v
w=1 fv−1(w)× xw otherwise
(10)
ei = ft−1(i) (11)
[49] extends from [76] to guarantee the t-consistency
of shares, i.e., any subset of t shares or more always re-
construct the same secret. A random polynomial func-
tion f(x) is created as in [76] (f(0) = d). However, ki,1
and ki,2 are random keys stored at PTi and ki,2 is do
not need to be distinct from each other. Next, n shares
{ci}i=1,··· ,n are created by Equation 12 and stored on
the NB. Secret d can be reconstructed by Lagrange in-
terpolation from t pairs {ki,1, ci + ki,2}.
ci = f(ki,1)− ki,2 (12)
[46,61] extend from [73] (Section 2.4). However, none
verifies the correctness of shares. In addition, both ap-
proaches verify a strong t-consistency property. The
verification processes guarantee that any subset of t
shares or more (created by summing n random polyno-
mial functions of degree t−1 in [73]) always reconstruct
the same secret, but that any subset of t shares or fewer
cannot. Verification time is slower in [46] than in [61].
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Eventually, in (t, L, n) threshold ramp SSSs (RSSSs)
introduced by Blackley [13], the secret cannot be recon-
structed from t − L or less shares (vs. t − 1 or less in
above SSSs), with 1 ≤ ` ≤ L−1 shares being allowed to
leak information about the secret. Thus, RSSSs propose
a tradeoff between security and efficiency (measured by
entropy) [55]. Let H(d) and H(ei)i=1,··· ,n be the en-
tropy of the secret and its shares, respectively. In SSSs,
H(ei) ≥ H(d), while in RSSSs, H(ei) = H(d)÷ L. [55]
also introduces the notion of strong and weak RSSSs,
and shows that Shamir-based SSSs may be weak. Yet,
most of the following RSSSs still extend Shamir’s SSS.
2.2 Group 2: Multi Secret Sharing Schemes Type I
The first (m, t, n) MSSS type I [94] extends from [76]
to reduce share volume and execution time. All secrets
are shared at once, with share volume being controlled
to remain close to that of secrets. To share m secrets
{dj}j=1,··· ,m among n PTs, n keys {ki}i=1,··· ,n are cre-
ated with a two-variables one-way function. Then, a
polynomial (Equation 1) is created over a finite field
[76], with a degree w = max(m, t)− 1.
Moreover, coefficients {uj}j=1,··· ,m are secrets
{dj}j=1,··· ,m and other coefficients {uj}j=(m+1),··· ,t are
random integers. Next,m+n−t shares {ch}h=1,··· ,(m+n−t)
are generated by Equation 13 and are published on a
NB. Finally, secrets are reconstructed by Lagrange in-
terpolation from t or more keys and w shares.
ch =
{
f (kh) if 1 ≤ h ≤ n
f (H(h)) if n+ 1 ≤ h ≤ n+m− t (13)
[90] extends from [80] (Section 2.11) by reducing
execution time and dynamically adjusting data block
size. In the sharing process, secrets are organized into
o unfixed size blocks {bl}l=1,··· ,o. Data block bl stores
tl secrets {dl,q}q=1,··· ,tl . Next, keys ki are randomly se-
lected and matrix A = [ax,y]n×max(t1,··· ,to) is created by
Equation 14, where l = 1, · · · , o, ul,q is a random inte-
ger and Al = [ax,y]n×tl such that Al is made of the first
tl columns of A. Next, o×tl shares {cl,h}l=1,··· ,o;h=1,··· ,tl
are created by Equation 15, where v is a random integer.
Finally, each key ki is shared at PTi and {cl,h}l=1,··· ,o;
h=1,··· ,tl , A and tl are published on the NB. In the recon-
struction process, {ul,q}q=1,··· ,tl is created by solving
Equation 14. Then, secrets are reconstructed by solv-
ing Equation 15.
[fl(k1), · · · , fl(kn)]T = Al × [ul,1, · · · , ul,tl ]T (14)
cl,h =
∑tl
q=1 dl,q × v(q−1)(
∑h−1
l=1 tl+h−1)
+
∑tl
q=1 ul,q × v(tl+q−1)(
∑h−1
l=1 tl+h−1t)
(15)
2.3 Group 3: Multi Secret Sharing Schemes Type II
The first (m, tm, n) MSSS type II [18] extends [76] to
share m secrets with different threshold access struc-
tures. In the sharing process, PT identifiers {IDi}i=1,··· ,n
are randomly chosen from distinct integers. With re-
spect to secret dj , tj and a prime pj are selected such
that t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tm, p1 < p2 < · · · < pm,
P =
∏m
j=1 pj and dj < pj . Next, a polynomial of de-
gree tm − 1 (Equation 16) is created with coefficients
{uv}v=1,··· ,t−1 being integers chosen by the Chinese re-
mainder theorem [30] and the uniqueness theorem of
interpolating polynomial. ∀v ∈ [0, t− 1], uv ≡ uj,v mod
pj∀j = 1, · · · ,m where uj,v is a coefficient of a ran-
dom polynomial function of degree tj − 1 (fj(x) =∑tj−1
w=0 uj,v×xw [76]) and uj,0 = dj . Shares {ei}i=1,··· ,n
are generated by equation 17. Finally, IDi and ei are
stored at PTi, whereas {tj}j=1,··· ,m and {pj}j=1,··· ,m
are retained at the user’s. Secret dj is reconstructed
from pj and tj pairs (IDi, ei) by equations 18 and 19.
f(x) =
tm−1∑
v=0
uv × xv (16)
ei = f (IDi) mod P (17)
fj(0) ≡ dj mod pj (18)
fj(x) ≡ f(x) mod pj (19)
[75] shares unfixed sized data blocks with a linear
equation. There are tl secrets {dl,q}q=1,··· ,tl in block bl
(tl1 < tl2 if l1 < l2). Then, o × n shares {el,i}l=1,··· ,o;
i=1,··· ,n are created by multiplying bl with random ma-
trix A = [ax,y]n×max(t1,··· ,to) by Equation 20, where
Al = [ax,y]n×tl and Al is built from the first tl columns
of A. Next, o shares {el,i}l=1,··· ,o are stored at PTi and
matrix A is published on the NB. Finally, secrets from
block bl are reconstructed from matrix Al and tl shares
{el,i}i=1,··· ,tl by solving linear Equation 20.
[el,1, · · · , el,n]T = Al × [bl]T (20)
[61]’s MSSS extends from [61]’s SSS (Section 2.1)
with a new sharing process. At PTi, shares {ui,a,j}a=1,··· ,n
of secrets are computed and distributed to other PTs
[73] (Section 2.4). However, PTi’s actual share ei,j is
computed by weighting the sum of other PTs’ shares
(Equation 21), where wa is a random integer (weight).
ei,j =
n∑
a=1
wa × ui,a,j (21)
In [83], PTs are categorized into two groups: G1 =
{PTi}i=1,··· ,γ and G2 = {PTi}i=γ+1,··· ,n, with the ob-
jective of reducing share volume. PTs of G1 store only
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one key and one share. To share m secrets
{dj}j=1,··· ,m, a key ki and an identifier IDi are defined
for each PTi. Next, a first polynomial f1 (x) is defined
by Equation 22, where coefficients {u1,v}v=1,··· ,t−1 are
random integers. Then, n shares {e1,i}i=1,··· ,n are cre-
ated by Equation 23. Moreover, (m− 1) × γ pseudo
shares {ej,i}j=2,··· ,m;i=1,··· ,γ are generated with a pseudo-
random number generator, keys {ki}i=1,··· ,γ and shares
{e1,i}i=1,··· ,γ . Next, m−1 polynomials f2(x), · · · , fm(x)
(Equation 22) are solved from m× γ pseudo shares
{ej,i}j=2,··· ,m;i=1,··· ,γ andm secrets {dj}j=2,··· ,m to con-
struct the other (m− 1)× (n− γ) shares
{ej,i}j=2,··· ,m;i=γ+1,··· ,n (Equations 22 and 23). Even-
tually, each PTi ∈ G1 stores ki and one share e1,i; and
each PTi ∈ G2 stores shares {ej,i}j=1,··· ,m.
fj (x) = dj +
t−1∑
v=1
uj,v × xv (22)
ej,i = fj (IDi) (23)
To reconstruct the secrets, t of n PTs in bothG1 and
G2 are selected. If PTi ∈ G1, pseudo shares {ej,i}j=2,··· ,m
are generated as above. Then, secret data are recon-
structed by Lagrange interpolation from their shares,
m× t pseudo shares and t IDs.
2.4 Group 4: Data-Verifiable Secret Sharing Schemes
There are only three (t, n) VSSSs in this group. [73]
helps each PT verify other PTs’ shares with the help
of an RSA cryptosystem [74]. To share secret d at PTi,
a random polynomial function fi (Equation 24) is cre-
ated such that d =
∑n
i=1 wi,0. Then, t signatures
{s di,v}v=0,··· ,t−1 are created (Equation 25, where p is
a prime and d = logp
∏n
i=1 yi) and shared on the NB.
Then, shares {ui,a}a=1,··· ,n are created by Equation 26
and distributed to other PTs. PTi’s actual share ei is
created by summing other PTs’ shares (Equation 27)
if they are correct (Equation 28). Secrets are recon-
structed by Lagrange interpolation.
fi(x) =
t−1∑
v=0
wi,v × xv (24)
s di,v =
{
yi if v = 0
pwi,v otherwise
(25)
ui,a = fi(a) (26)
ei =
n∑
a=1
ua,i (27)
pua,i =
t−1∏
v=0
(s da,v)
iv (28)
[23] extends from [76] by verifying the correctness of
reconstructed secrets. To this aim, in the sharing pro-
cess, a signature s d is created for each secret d (Equa-
tion 29, where u is a random integer). Then, s d is pub-
lished on the NB.
s d = ud mod p (29)
In the reconstruction process, secret d is reconstructed
from t shares by secure multi-party computation (SMC)
[95] (Equation 30). Next, a multi-prover zero-knowledge
argument [85] helps verify correctness. Secret d is cor-
rect if uv
′′
1+···+v′′n × s dv0 = ∏ni=1 v′i mod p, where
{v′i}i=1,··· ,n and {v′′i }i=1,··· ,n are generated by Equa-
tions 31 and 32, respectively, and {vi}i=0,··· ,n and
{wi}i=0,··· ,n are random integers such that d =
∑n
i=1 wi.
d =
∑
i∈G
ei × ∏
j∈G,j 6=i
j/ (j − i)
 (30)
v′i = u
vi mod p (31)
v′′i = vi − v0 × wi mod p (32)
[77] exploits NTRU encryption [74] and a hash func-
tion to verify the correctness of shares. First, n pairs of
PTi keys (ki,1, ki,2)i=1,··· ,n are randomly created with
NTRU. Then, shares ei and signatures s di are created
by Equations 33 and 34, respectively, where {xi}i=1,··· ,n
are random integers, w is a random polynomial called
blinding value and f is a random polynomial [76]. Keys
(ki,1, ki,2) and shares ei are stored at PTi and {xi}i=1,··· ,n
and signatures {s di}i=1,··· ,n are published on the NB.
Before reconstruction, each share ei is verified for cor-
rectness by Equations 35 and 36. Finally, t pairs of
(ei, xi)i=1,··· ,n help reconstruct secrets from the poly-
nomial by Lagrange interpolation.
ei ≡ (w × ki,1 + f(xi)) mod p1 (33)
s di ≡ (w × ki,1 +H(f(xi))) mod p1 (34)
yi ≡ ki,2 × ei mod p1 mod p2 (35)
yi ≡ ki,2 × s di mod p1 mod p2 (36)
2.5 Group 5: Key-Verifiable Secret Sharing Schemes
In [53], the only (t, n) VSSS in this group, PT keys and
signatures are independent. Hence, if some PTs come
or go, the keys of other PTs do not change. PT keys
{ki}i=1,··· ,n and identifiers {IDi}i=1..n are randomly
chosen. On the other hand, key signatures {s ki}i=1,··· ,n
are generated with the help of an RSA cryptosystem
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(Equation 37). Then, key ki is stored at PTi, while iden-
tifiers and key signatures (IDi, s ki)i=1,··· ,n are pub-
lished on the NB. For sharing secret d, several groups of
PTs {Gr}r=1,··· ,g are selected, and then shares {er}r=1,··· ,g
are created by Equations 38, 39, 40 and 41, where u is a
random integer, p4 > p3 and p4 > p2 > p1. Next, v, w,
{Gr}r=1,··· ,g and {er}r=1,··· ,g are published on the NB.
Before reconstruction, the key signature of PTi ∈ Gr is
verified to check whether s ki = v
ki mod p2. If this is
true, secrets are reconstructed by Equations 42 and 43.
s ki=(p1)
ki mod p2 (37)
v=(p1)
u
mod p2 (38)
u× p3=a mod φ (p2) (39)
wr = d⊕ (s kr,1)u mod p2⊕· · ·⊕ (s kr,g)u mod p2 (40)
er = wr ×
∏t
x=1
1−IDr,x
−IDr,x +∑t
x=1
(s kr,x)
u mod p2×
∏t
y=1,y 6=x
1−IDr,y
IDr,x−IDr,y
IDr,x
mod p4
(41)
d = wr ⊕
(
vkr,1 mod p2
)⊕ · · · ⊕ (vkr,g mod p2) (42)
wr = er ×
∏t
x=1
−IDr,x
1−IDr,x+∑t
x=1
vkr,x mod p2×
∏t
y=1,y 6=x
−IDr,y
IDr,x−IDr,y
IDr,x−1 mod p4
(43)
2.6 Group 6: Key and data-verifiable secret sharing
schemes
Unlike other schemes, [98]’s (t, n) VSSS verifies the cor-
rectness of both keys and shares. Moreover, it achieves
a smaller share size than that of secrets, by splitting
secrets before the sharing process. In the sharing pro-
cess, key k0 and keys {ki}i=1,··· ,n are randomly selected
from a prime and distinct positive integers, respectively.
Key signatures {s ki}i=0,··· ,n are constructed by Equa-
tion 44, where z is a positive integer and ϕ(p) is Euler’s
totient function [48]. Next, any secret d is split into t2
smaller pieces stored in Matrix D = [dx,y]t×t. Then,
two types of shares are created (PTs’ shares and NB’s
shares). PTs’ shares {Ei = {ei,0, · · · , ei,a}}i=1,··· ,n are
sets of randomly distinct positive integers such that
ei,0 is the sum of all entries in Ei (ei,0 =
∑a
h=1 ei,h)
and ei,0 < p. To construct the NB’s shares {ci}i=1,··· ,n,
polynomial function f(x) (Equation 45) is created from
split secrets and PTs’ shares by Equations 46 and 47,
where A is a Jordan normal form of D2. Finally, NB’s
shares {ci}i=1,··· ,n are constructed from Equations 48
and 49; and share signatures {s di,j}i=1,··· ,n;j=1,··· ,m
are created from Equation 50. Keys ki and shares Ei
are stored at PTi; shares {ci}i=1,··· ,n, share signatures
{s di,j}j=1,··· ,n;j=1,··· ,m, key k0, key signatures
{s ki}i=0,··· ,n, p and A are published on the NB.
s ki=
{
k−10 mod ϕ(p) if i = 0
zki mod p if 1 ≤ i ≤ n (44)
f (x)=
t−1∑
i=1
ui × xi−1 (45)
ui=(((z)
k0)ei,0)−1yi mod p (46)
D × [y1, · · · , yt]T=[y1, · · · , yt]T ×A (47)
ci=f(vi) (48)
vi=((z)
k0)ki mod p (49)
s di,j=z
ei,j mod p (50)
In the reconstruction process, key ki is correct if
((z)ki)s kn+1 = s ki mod p. PTi’s share ei,j is correct
if (((z)k0)ei,j )s kn+1 = s di,j mod p. Next, polynomial
function f(x) is reconstructed from t pairs of key and
NB’s share {ki, ci} by Lagrange interpolation and Equa-
tion 49. Then, {ya}a=1,··· ,t are created by Equation 51.
Finally, secret d is reconstructed by solving Equation 47.
yi = ui
a∏
j=1
((z)k0)ei,j (51)
2.7 Group 7: Data-Verifiable Multi Secret Sharing
Schemes Type I
The only (m, t, n) VMSSS type I in this group shares
and reconstructs all secrets at once with the help of
a cellular automaton, to enhance computation perfor-
mance. Moreover, the correctness of shares is verified
before reconstruction [37]. In the sharing process, a set
of integers
{
u1, · · · , umax(m,t), · · · , uw+n
}
is created, where
w is a random integer such that w ≥ max(m, t),
uj = dj if 1 ≤ j ≤ min(t,m) and uj is a random inte-
ger when m < j ≤ t. Others values of uj are created
with the help of the cellular automaton. Then, shares
{ch}h=1,··· ,m−t are generated by Equation 52. Shares
2 A is a Jordan normal form of D if DY = Y A, where Y
is a row matrix and A is a square, upper triangular matrix
whose entries are all the same integer values on the diagonal,
all 1 on the entries immediately above the diagonal, and 0
elsewhere.
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{ei}i=1,··· ,n and their signatures {s di}i=1,··· ,n are cre-
ated by Equations 53 and 54, where v is a random inte-
ger. Finally, each share ei is shared at PTi and shares
{ch}h=1,··· ,m−t and signatures {s dh}h=1,··· ,n are pub-
lished on the NB.
ch=dt+h + ut+h (mod2) (52)
ei=um+i (53)
s di=v
ei mod p (54)
Before reconstruction, share integrity is verified by
Equation 54. Next,
{
u1, · · · , umax(m,t), · · · , uw+n
}
are
reconstructed from t shares with the cellular automa-
ton. Finally, all secrets are regenerated by Equation 55.
dj =
{
uj if 1 ≤ j ≤ min(t,m)
cj−t + uj (modp) otherwise
(55)
2.8 Group 8: Key-Verifiable Multi Secret Sharing
Schemes Type I
A fair amount of research has been done on (m, t, n)
VMSSSs type I, half of which belong to this group.
[99] extends from [94] by verifying whether keys shared
between PTs are correct. In the sharing process, each
key ki, its signature s ki and public key v are created
by Equations 56, 57 and 58, respectively, where prime
p1 is a multiple of prime p2, {ui}i=0,··· ,n are random
integers and φ is Euler’s totient function [48]. Key ki is
stored at PTi and {s ki}i=0,··· ,n and v are published on
the NB. Before reconstruction, keys are verified. Key ki
is correct if ((s k0)
ki)v ≡ u′i mod p1.
ki=(s ki)
u0 mod p1 (56)
s ki=(p2)
ui mod p1 (57)
v=(u0)
−1 mod φ(p1) (58)
[27] also extends from [94] with the same goal. Only
key and signature generation actually varies. However,
the verification process is more efficient. Key ki is cre-
ated by Equations 59, 60 and 61, where ui=1,2,3 are ran-
dom integers and f is any two-variable one-way func-
tion. Signature s ki of key ki is created by Equation 62,
where u4 is a random integer. Key ki is stored at PTi,
while u1, · · · , u4 and {s ki}i=1,··· ,n are published on the
NB.
ki=f (u1, wi) (59)
wi=((vi)
u3)
u2 mod p (60)
u2 × u3≡1 mod φ (p) (61)
s ki=(u4)
ki mod p (62)
[28] in turn extends from [27] by proposing new
secret sharing and reconstruction processes to reduce
computation costs. After keys and signatures are cre-
ated, shares {cj,1}j=1,··· ,n and {cj,2}j=1,··· ,m are gen-
erated by Equations 63, 64, 65 and 66, where u0 is a
random integer. Next, {cj,1}j=1,··· ,n and {cj,2}j=1,··· ,m
are published on the NB. After key verification, secrets
are reconstructed by Equations 67, 68 and 69.
cj,1=dj − yj+n (63)
cj,2=kj − yj−1 (64)
yj=
{
kj+1 if 0 ≤ j < t
−∑tv=1 uv × yj−v mod p otherwise (65)
(x− u0)t=xt + u1 × xt−1 + · · ·+ ut = 0 (66)
dj=yj+n + cj,2 (67)
yj=

kj+1 if 0 ≤ j < t
kj+1 − cj+1,1 if t ≤ j < n
f(j)× (u0)j mod p otherwise
(68)
f(x)=
t∑
v=1
yv−1
(u0)
v−1
t∏
w=1&w 6=v
x− w + 1
v − w mod p (69)
[89] extends from [21] (Section 2.9) to improve the
efficiency of the sharing and reconstruction processes.
To this aim, secrets are split into blocks of size t that
are each shared and reconstructed all at once. Block bl
is divided into n shares {cl,h}h=1,··· ,n by Equation 70,
where A = [ai,w]t×n, ai,w = H(ul × ki × v)w−1, and
{ul}l=1,··· ,o and v are random integers. Key ki is stored
at PTi, whereas key signatures {s ki}i=1,··· ,n, shares
{cl,h}l=1,··· ,o;h=1,··· ,n and {xl = ul× v}l=1,··· ,o are pub-
lished on the NB. To reconstruct secrets, shares and
keys are verified for correctness with a bilinear map
f(ul × ki × v, v) = f(xl, s ki). Then, secrets are recon-
structed by solving Equation 70.
[cl,1, · · · , cl,n]T = A× [bl]T (70)
[38] also extends from [21], pursuing the same goal
as [89]. The difference is that secrets are divided into
n+m− t shares to reduce the number of shares. Shares
{ch}h=1,··· ,(n+m−t) are computed by Equation 71, where
A = [ax,y](m+n)×(m+n−t), ax,y = (w)
x(y−1)
, zi = H(u×
v × ki), and u, v and w are random integers. Key ki
is stored at PTi, whereas key signatures {s ki}i=1,··· ,n,
shares {ch}h=1,··· ,(n+m−t), data signatures {s dj}j=1,··· ,m
and x = u× v are published on the NB. To reconstruct
secrets, shares and keys are verified for correctness with
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a bilinear map f(u×ki×v, v) = f(x, s ki). Then, secrets
are reconstructed by solving Equation 71.
[c1, · · · , cn+m−t]T = A× [z1, · · · , zn, d1, · · · , dm]T (71)
Unlike in other schemes, PTs in [20] can be added
or deleted. Moreover, threshold t can vary. To this aim,
keys ki, key signatures s ki and PT identifiers IDi are
randomly selected such that they are different from
one PT to the other. Then, secrets are organized into
unfixed-sized blocks, where block bl stores ul secrets. All
secrets {dl,q}q=1,··· ,ul in block bl are divided into n+ul−
tl shares {cl,h}h=1,··· ,(n+ul−tl) by Equations 72, 73, 74,
75 and 76, where zl is a random integer. Each key ki is
stored at PTi and identifiers {IDi}i=1,··· ,n, signatures
{s ki}i=1,··· ,n and shares {yl}l=1,··· ,n and {cl,h}l=1,··· ,o;
h=1,··· ,(n+ul−tl) are published on the NB. Before recon-
struction, keys are verified for correctness with a dis-
crete logarithm modulo and a one-way hash function.
Finally, each secret dl,q in block bl is reconstructed by
Lagrange interpolation.
cl,h=fl (n+ ul + h) (72)
fl(x)=
ul∑
v=1
dl,v ×∆1 +
n∑
v=1
(s kv)
zl ×∆2 mod p1 (73)
∆1=
ul∏
w=1&w 6=v
x− (n+ w)
v − w ×
n∏
i=1
x− IDi
(n+ v)− IDi (74)
∆2=
n∏
i=1&i 6=v
x− IDi
IDv − IDi ×
ul∏
w=1
x− (n+ w)
IDv − (n+ w) (75)
yl=(p2)
zl mod p1 (76)
[60] extends from [72] to reduce computation cost
and verify key correctness. Secrets are organized into
blocks of size t− 1. Keys {ki}i=1,··· ,n are randomly se-
lected and their signatures {s ki}i=1,··· ,n are created
by Equation 77, where H is a hash function. In block
bl, the first secret dl,1 is divided into two shares cl,1,1
and cl,1,2 by Equation 78, where u is a random integer.
Other secrets in block bl are shared by Equations 79
and 80. Key ki is stored at PTi and {s ki}i=1,··· ,n ,
{cl,q,h}l=1,··· ,o;q=1,··· ,t−2; h=1,··· ,q+1 and {cl,t−1,h}l=1,··· ,o;
h=1,··· ,n are published on the NB. Before reconstruc-
tion, each key ki is verified for validity by Equation 81.
Then, all secrets in each block are reconstructed by La-
grange interpolation.
s ki=H
(
Ht−1 (ki)⊕ ki
)
(77)
cl,1,h=u× h+ dl,1 − (kq ⊕H (ki)) (78)
cl,q,h=fl,q (h)− (kq ⊕Hq (kq)) (79)
fl,q(x)=
{
dl,q + u× x if q = 1
dl,q +
∑q
v=1 x
v × fl,q−1 (x) otherwise
(80)
s ki=H
(
Ht−1 (ki)⊕ ki
)
(81)
Finally, [52] propose two schemes. They create keys
and verify their correctness by using a one-way hash
function and a LFSR public key cryptosystem [40,41].
The first scheme shares and reconstructs secrets as [94],
while the second scheme does as [28], while providing
higher security than [94,28] with keys of same lengths.
2.9 Group 9: Key and Data-Verifiable Multi Secret
Sharing Schemes Type I
The other third of (m, t, n) VMSSSs type I belong to
this group. [82] prevents cheating from malicious PTs
by verifying both shares and keys. Keys {ki}i=1,··· ,n
and their signatures {s ki}i=1,··· ,n are created by Equa-
tions 82, 83, 84, 85 and 86, where {uv}v=0,··· ,t−1 are
random integers and a1, · · · , a5 are set as discrete log-
arithms. Let p1 and p2 be big primes. a1 is a random
integer, a2 = (2× p1 + 1)(2× p2 + 1), a3 = p1 × p2 and
a3×a2 = φ(a5), where φ is Euler’s totient function [48].
Key ki is stored at PTi, while signatures {s ki}i=1,··· ,n
and {wv}v=0,··· ,t−1 are published on the NB. Key cor-
rectness is checked by Equation 87.
f(x)=
(
t−1∑
v=0
uv × xv
)
mod a3 (82)
wv=(p1)
uv mod a2 (83)
yi=
∏
∀PTv,v 6=i
(IDi − IDv) mod a3 (84)
ki=(f(IDi)/yi) mod a3 (85)
s ki=(a1)
ki mod a2 (86)
((a1)
yi)
ki=
t−1∏
v=0
(wv)
(IDi)
v
mod a2 (87)
A 4-tuple of shares {cj,1, · · · , cj,4} is created by Equa-
tions 88 and 89, where cj,1 and cj,2 are random integers.
Shares {cj,h}j=1,··· ,m;h=1,··· ,4 are published on the NB.
Before reconstruction, each PTi must verify share and
key correctness by Equation 90. If verification is posi-
tive, secrets are reconstructed by Equations 91 and 92,
where G is any group of t PTs.
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cj,3=(a1)
−a5+cj,1 × (cj,2)2×a5+cj,1+1 mod a2 (88)
cj,4=((cj,2)
u0 − dj)(cj,3)−u0 mod a2 (89)
((cj,3)
ki)a4 ≡(s ki)a4×cj,1−1×
((cj,2)
ki)2+a4(cj,1+1) mod a2
(90)
dj =
(∏
PTi∈G((cj,2)
ki)4i
)−(
cj,4
∏
PTi∈G((cj3)
ki)4i
)
mod a2
(91)
4i =
∏
∀PTv∈G
−IDv ×
∏
∀PTv∈G
(IDi − IDv) (92)
[19] extends from [82] to improve the efficiency of
the sharing and reconstruction processes. To this aim,
j 3-tuples of shares {cj,1, cj,3, cj,4}j=1,··· ,m are created
by Equations 93 and 94 and published on the NB. Be-
fore reconstruction, each PT must verify share and key
correctness by Equation 95. If verification is positive,
secrets are reconstructed by Equations 96 and 92.
cj,3=(a1)
a5×cj,1 mod a2 (93)
cj,4=
(
(a1)
u0×a5×cj,1 mod a2
)⊕ dj (94)
((cj,3)
ki)a4≡(s ki)cj,1 mod a2 (95)
dj=cj,4 ⊕
∏
∀PTi∈G
((cj,3)
ki)4i mod a2 (96)
[78] extends from [94] by checking whether keys and
shares are valid, with the help of a discrete logarithm.
Signatures {s dj}j=1,··· ,max(m,t) are created after secrets
are shared by Equation 97, where {uj}j=1,··· ,m are se-
crets (uj = dj) and {uj}j=(m+1),··· ,t are random inte-
gers. They are then published on the NB. Before recon-
struction, keys are verified first, and then shares are,
both by Equation 98. Signature s dj is also used to
check share integrity.
s dj=(p1)
uj mod p2 (97)
(p1)
ci=
max(t,m)∏
h=1
(ch+n+1)
f(w,ki)
h
mod p2 (98)
In [21], each secret dj is divided independently into
vary threshold tj . Keys {ki}i=1,··· ,n are randomly se-
lected such that their signatures {s ki}i=1,··· ,n (Equa-
tion 99, where v is a random integer) are unique. Each
secret dj is divided into n shares {cj,h}h=1,··· ,n by Equa-
tions 100 and 101, where Aj = [ax,y](n×ti), ax,y =
(u)x(y−1), Zj = [wj × v, dj × (k1)v, · · · , dj × (kn)v] and
u and wj are random integers. Signature s dj of dj is
created by Equation 102. Keys ki are stored at PTi,
whereas key signatures {s ki}i=1,··· ,n, shares
{wj , cj,1, · · · , cj,n}j=1,··· ,m, signatures {s dj}j=1,··· ,m, u
and v are published on the NB. Before reconstruction,
shares and keys are verified for correctness with a bi-
linear map f((ki)
s dj , v) = f(s dj , (kj)
v). Then, secrets
are reconstructed by solving linear Equations 100 and
101.
s ki=(ki)
v (99)
[cj,1, · · · , cj,n]T=Aj × [Zj ]T (100)
dj=H(wj × v) (101)
s dj=dj × v (102)
Unlike other schemes that compute integers over a
finite field, [25] exploits binary strings in all processes
to improve the efficiency of both sharing and recon-
struction processes. In the sharing process, two kinds of
keys are randomly created in binary string format: PT
keys {ki}i=1,··· ,n and user keys {uj,v}j=1,··· ,m;v=1,··· ,tl .
Then, each share cj,h is created by Equation 103, where
H is a one-way hash function and ‖ is the concatenation
operator. Finally, shares cj,h, H(dj), H (H(ki ‖ j ‖ h))
with j = 1, · · · ,m; h = 1, · · · , tl and i = 1, · · · , n, are
published on the NB.
cj,h = dj ⊕
{⊕i:PTi∈uj,vH(ki ‖ j ‖ h)} (103)
Secrets are reconstructed by Equation 104 if all keys
pass the verification process, which is split in two steps.
Before reconstruction, keys {ki}i=1,··· ,n are checked for
correctness by comparison with signaturesH (H(ki ‖ j ‖ h)).
After reconstruction, secrets {dj}j=1,··· ,m are checked
for correctness by comparison with signatures H(dj).
dj = cl,h ⊕
{⊕i:PTi∈uj,vH(ki ‖ j ‖ h)} (104)
Finally, [16] extends from [77] by sharing multiple
secrets, to improve sharing/reconstruction efficiency and
reduce share volume. To this aim, PTi’s identifier IDi
is randomly selected and PTi’s key ki and signatures
{s kv}v=0,··· ,(t−1) are created by Equations 105 and
106, respectively, where x and y are randomly created
with NTRU [74] and w is NTRU’s blinding value. Each
secret dj is divided into a 3-tuple of shares {cj,1, cj,2, cj,3}
by Equations 107 and 108, where cj,1 is a random inte-
ger. Key ki is stored at PTi, whereas identifiers
{IDi}i=1,··· ,n, signature {s kv}v=0,··· ,(t−1) and shares
{cj,h}j=1,··· ,m;h=1,··· ,3 are published on the NB.
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ki=
t−1∑
v=0
uv × (IDi)v (105)
s kv=w × x+ uv mod p1 (106)
cj,2=w × x+ cj,1 mod p1 (107)
cj,3=dj ⊕H(u0 × cj,2) (108)
Before reconstruction, keys and shares are verified
for correctness by Equations 109 and 110, respectively.
Finally, secrets are reconstructed by Equation 111.
ki = y
t−1∑
v=0
s kv(IDi)
v mod p2 (109)
y × ki × cj,2 = y
t−1∑
v=0
(wv × (IDi)v × cj,1) mod p2 (110)
dj = cj,3 ⊕H
∑
i∈G
ki × cj,2 ×
∏
v∈G&v 6=i
−IDv
IDi − IDv

(111)
2.10 Group 10: Data-Verifiable Multi Secret Sharing
Schemes Type II
VMSSSs type II are recent. Unlike all previous SSSs, [6]
verifies both PT honesty and share correctness with in-
ner and outer signatures, respectively. Inner signatures
are signatures that help verify secret correctness af-
ter reconstruction. If one or more shares are erroneous,
then reconstructed secrets do not match with their in-
ner signatures. Outer signatures are share signatures.
The correctness of shares is checked before reconstruct-
ing secrets.
In the sharing process of [6], n distinct random lin-
ear equations {fi}i=1,··· ,n (Equation 112, where coef-
ficients ui,v are random positive integers) are created.
Then, m secrets {dl,q}q=1,··· ,t−1 are organized into o
blocks bl of size t− 1. The inner signature s bl of block
bl is created with the help of an homomorphic function
(Equation 113). Next, n shares {el,i}i=1,··· ,n are created
by Equation 114. Their outer signatures {s outl,i}i=1,··· ,n
are created with any hash function. Shares {el,i, s outl,i}
l=1,··· ,o are stored at PTi.
fi(x1, · · · , xt)=xt × ui,v +
t−1∑
v=1
(xv + 2)× ui,v (112)
s bl=H(bl) (113)
el,i=fi(bl, s bl) (114)
Before reconstruction, shares from t out of n PTs are
verified against their outer signatures. Then, blocks and
their inner signatures are reconstructed by solving the
linear equations. Finally, recovered blocks are verified
against their inner signatures. If the test fails, erroneous
blocks can be reconstructed from shares in a new PT
group.
[5] extends from [76] by sharing each secret at fewer
than n PTs’. PT failure is also allowed, more specif-
ically by allowing data updates at remaining online
PTs. Moreover, [5] also protects from PT group cheat-
ing by imposing a new constraint: no PT group can hold
enough shares to reconstruct the secret when n < 2t−2.
PT honesty and share correctness are checked as in [6].
In addition, this scheme separates outer signature cre-
ation and verification from the sharing and reconstruc-
tion processes.
Although [5] is an MSSS, each secret is shared and
reconstructed independently. Inner signature s dj of se-
cret dj is created with the help of an homomorphic func-
tion. Next, PTs are split into two groups: n−t+2 PTs in
group G1 and t+2 PTs in group G2. Then, t+2 pseudo
shares {ej,i}PTi∈G2 (G2’s shares created to construct
polynomial f2 but not stored at PTi ∈ G2) are created
from dj ’s identifier d idj and identifiers {IDi}PTi∈G2
of PTs in G2 with an homomorphic function (Equa-
tion 115).
ej,i=f1(d idj , IDi) (115)
Next, a polynomial f2 of degree t−1 is created from
dj , inner signature s dj , pseudo shares {ej,i}PTi∈G2 and
PT identifiers {IDi}PTi∈G2 by Lagrange interpolation
(Equation 116, where {(x1, y2), . . . , (xt, yt)} =
{(H(Kd), dj), (H(Ks), s dj)}∪{(H(IDi), ej,i)PTi∈G2}).
f2(x)=
t∑
u=1
∏
1≤v≤t,u6=v
x− xv
xu − xv × yu (116)
Shares {ej,i}PTi∈G1 are created by Equation 117
and stored at PTi ∈ G1. To reconstruct dj , t out of
n PTs from G1 and G2 are selected. Secrets are re-
constructed by Lagrange interpolation (Equation 116)
from both shares and pseudo shares (Equation 115).
ej,i=f2(H(IDi)) (117)
2.11 Group 11: Key and Data-Verifiable Multi Secret
Sharing Schemes Type II
[80] is the only (m, t, n) VMSSS type II. It exploits el-
liptic curve cryptography to verify the correctness of
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both shares and keys. In the sharing process, keys K =
{ki,q}i=1,··· ,n,q=1,··· ,t are randomly chosen from small
integers. Then, l× t secrets {dl,q}l=1,··· ,o;q=1,··· ,t are or-
ganized into o blocks {bl}l=1,··· ,o of size t. Each block
bl is divided into n shares {el,i}i=1,··· ,n by Equation 118.
Signature s dl,q of dl,q is created by Equation 119, where
u is an elliptic curve point. Keys {ki,q}q=1,··· ,t and shares
{el,i}l=1,··· ,o are stored at PTi, whereas signatures
{s dl,q}l=1,··· ,o;q=1,··· ,t are published on the NB. Before
reconstruction, each share el,i and its keys {ki,q}q=1,··· ,t
are verified for correctness by Equation 120. Finally,
each block is reconstructed by solving t simultaneous
linear equations (Equation 118).
[el,1, · · · , el,n]T=K × [bl]T mod p (118)
s dl,q=u× dl,q (119)
u× [el,1, · · · , el,n]T=K × [s dl,1, · · · , s dl,t]T (120)
3 Discussion
In this section, we compare the SSSs presented in Sec-
tion 2 along four axes. First, we provide a global view of
the evolution of SSSs since their inception (Section 3.1).
Second, we synthesize and account for the various shar-
ing and verification techniques used in SSSs to enforce
data security (Section 3.2). Third, we compare the fea-
tures provided by SSSs beyond data privacy and in-
tegrity (Section 3.3). Finally, we study the factors that
influence the cost of cloud SSS-based solutions in the
pay-as-you-go paradigm (Section 3.4).
3.1 Evolution of Secret Sharing Schemes
To clarify the historical relationships between the SSSs
reviewed in this paper and better visualize the improve-
ments brought to Shamir’s [76] and Blakley’s [12] schemes
since 1979, we refer the reader to Figure 10. In this
flowchart, each scheme is identified by a bibliographi-
cal reference (in red), the group (in orange) and type
(in yellow) it belongs to (Section 2), and whether it
enforces key (represented by a green K) and/or data
(represented by a blue D) verification. Moreover, a brief
text describes the novelty brought by each scheme. Fi-
nally, an arrow from scheme S1 to scheme S2 indicates
that S1 extends from S2. For example, [78], proposed
in 2005, is a VMSSS type I belonging to Group 9. This
scheme can verify both data and key correctness and
extends from [94] to improve sharing and reconstruc-
tion efficiency.
Figure 10 quite clearly shows that SSSs have been
less studied for almost 25 years than since the 2000’s,
when they attracted new attention in conjunction with
the development of new, on-line distributed systems,
i.e., clusters, grids and the cloud. Moreover, research
about secret sharing seems to have accelerated since
2012, with the wide spread of cloud computing and as-
sociated data security concerns.
3.2 Sharing, Reconstruction and Verification Methods
SSSs may be subdivided into five subprocesses, i.e.,
data sharing, data reconstruction, key creation, key ver-
ification and data verification. Of course, data sharing
and reconstruction are the main processes for all groups
of SSSs (Table 1). Key creation is always optional. Fi-
nally, data verification is the focus of groups 4, 6, 7, 9,
10 and 11; and key verification the focus of groups 5,
6, 8, 9 and 11. The methods supporting these processes
in each studied SSS are summarized in Table 3.
Approximately half of the surveyed SSSs share se-
crets by polynomial interpolation and reconstruct them
by Lagrange interpolation, as Shamir’s [76]. Yet, other
methods, such as homomorphic encryption, NTRU or
RSA enhance security. Similarly, approximately half of
the schemes necessitating keys generate them at ran-
dom,while more elaborate methods such as hash func-
tions, LFSR, NTRU or RSA help protect keys. Even-
tually, the same variety of methods is found in the key
and data verification processes, although discrete loga-
rithm modulo and hash functions are by far the most
popular.
Given such variety, it is difficult to crisply rank the
security level of all studied schemes. SSSs have indeed
been continually addressing different issues over time,
and thus adopted ad-hoc methods suited to their objec-
tives. Moreover, the papers describing them typically
do not compare to one another. Thence, we push the
comparison of SSSs’ features and cost in the following
subsections.
3.3 Features of Secret Sharing Schemes
SSSs mainly aim at enforcing data security (privacy,
availability and integrity). However, in the context of
cloud data processing, efficient data access (update,
search and aggregation operations) must also be made
possible by SSSs. Thus, some SSSs allow computation
(e.g., sums and averages [5,6,12,49,76,80] and exact
matches [6,12,25]) directly over shares, i.e., without re-
constructing secrets. To provide a global overview, the
features of all studied SSSs are synthesized in Table 4,
where an X means a particular feature is supported by
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the corresponding SSS(s); NB means that data avail-
ability is supported, but only when the NB is accessi-
ble; G means that data availability is supported only
when shares are replicated; IN and OUT stand for in-
ner and outer code verification, respectively; B means
that updates operate on data blocks instead of individ-
ual shares; and I means that exact matches are run on
indices.
3.3.1 Data Privacy and Availability
Since all SSSs divide data into n shares such that each
individual share is meaningless, they enforce data pri-
vacy by design. Moreover, data availability is guaran-
teed as long as t out of n PTs are available, since t PTs
are enough to reconstruct secrets. However, a coalition
of t or more malicious PTs can break any secret. Thus,
[5] provides further privacy by protecting data from PT
group cheating, by having a number of shares at all PTs
that is lower than t. Finally, since most (V)MSSSs type-
I store all shares in the NB, they are vulnerable and can
loose data access if the NB is compromised.
The privacy level of all SSSs mainly depends on pa-
rameter t. Provided PTs independently enforce sound
security measures, collecting at least t shares, i.e., com-
promising at least t PTs, is indeed harder and harder
when t increases. High data protection is thus achieved
when t is large [3,26], but at the expense of computing
overhead, especially when sharing and reconstructing
data (Section 3.4). Moreover, some SSSs may be inse-
cure for applications where t is limited in practice. For
instance, when t is a number of CSPs or servers, budget
constraints come into play. We discuss three frameworks
for outsourcing data in the cloud that address this issue
in Section 4.
The robustness of almost SSSs directly relies on the
gap between the two parameters n and t. The secret
can be recovered although up to n − t PTs disappear.
Nevertheless, computing time and storage costs become
prohibitive when n  t (Section 3.4). Thus, n should
be only a little bigger than t to achieve data availability
with acceptable costs.
3.3.2 Data Integrity
The reconstruction process in SSSs always produces the
correct result if secrets, shares and sharing and recon-
struction functions are defined over a finite field [8].
However, if shares are altered, reconstructed secrets are
mechanically incorrect. Thus, VSSSs and VMSSSs have
been introduced to enforce data integrity. We catego-
rize them into four classes: SSSs that verify keys, shares,
secrets or both secrets and shares.
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First, all schemes in groups 5, 6, 8, 9 and 11 ver-
ify keys before reconstructing shares. Hence, they can
detect PT cheating and prevent transferring any data
back to the user when incorrect keys are detected.
Second, most schemes in groups 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11
verify the correctness of shares before reconstruction to
reduce computation cost at the user’s (no reconstruc-
tion occurs from incorrect shares). However, they re-
quire extra storage for signatures.
Third, [23,25] verify the correctness of reconstructed
secrets. Their signature volumes are lower than that of
the second class of VSSSs, since the number of shares
is generally greater than that of secrets. However, in-
correct secrets are detected only after they are already
reconstructed.
Fourth, [6,5] verify the correctness of both secrets
and shares with inner and outer code verification, re-
spectively. Thus, no erroneous share is transferred to
the user. Moreover, any PT cheating is detected.
Finally, although VSSSs and MVSSSs guarantee in-
tegrity, they consume more storage to handle signatures
and more CPU power to verify keys, shares, and/or se-
crets. Moreover, to achieve the best possible verification
performance, i.e., the lowest possible false positive rate,
signatures must be big [5,6]. A larger storage volume is
thus required. We push the comparison of such costs in
Section 3.4.
3.3.3 Data Access
SSSs manage data at two levels: data piece or data
block. First, [83,5] and most schemes in groups 1, 4,
5, 6, 9 share secrets independently. Hence, they can
directly update data. For example, any secret can be
deleted by removing its shares at all PTs’. Second, [90,
75,89,20,60,80,6] share secrets as blocks and support
the homomorphic property. Thus, they allow updating
shared blocks without reconstruction. Moreover, they
update data faster because several shares in the same
data block can be updated at once. In contrast, the
schemes that share all secrets at once cannot perform
updates on shares. The whole database must indeed be
reconstructed, updated and then shared again. Thus,
such schemes require longer execution times and use
lots of memory when updating data.
Some SSSs allow computing exact matches on shares.
Since [76,12,49,80,6,5] use polynomial or linear equa-
tions to share data, they also allow sum and average
operations on shares. Moreover, [12,25,6] allow exact
matches on shares, because they use the same keys to
share all secrets. In contrast, [5] uses indices to achieve
exact match queries. Indices indeed help perform faster
exact matches than operating directly on shares, al-
though at the expense of extra storage volume. Thus,
the tradeoff between security and query efficiency must
be carefully considered before choosing an SSS. We fur-
ther discuss this issue in Sections 4 and 5.2.
3.3.4 Other Features
More features are included in some schemes. [49,46,61]
verify a strong t-consistency property. Thus, they guar-
antee that any subset of t shares or more always recon-
struct the same data, but that any subset of t shares or
fewer cannot. [53,20] allow the user to add and remove
PTs to/from the PT pool by updating the value of n.
[90,18,75,20,21] allow the user to assign different val-
ues of t to different secrets, to enforce different security
levels for each secret. Eventually, [5] allows inserting
new data even if some PTs disappear.
3.4 Costs
In the cloud pay-as-you-go paradigm, the cost of secur-
ing data must be balanced with the risk of data loss or
pilfering, and thus the level of data security must be
balanced with its cost. This is a particularly important
issue with secret sharing, which basically multiplies se-
cret data volume by n in the worst case (provided in-
dividual share volume is not greater than secret data
volume). We summarize the costs induced by SSSs in
Table 5.
SSS time complexity and storage volume depend on
a few parameters: m, n and t. To determine time com-
plexity and storage volume, we suppose that only m
is big. Other parameters n and t should remain quite
small, because they relate to the number of PTs, i.e.,
the number of cloud service providers, which is limited
in practice. Moreover, some SSSs such as [54,72,98] can-
not assign a big value to parameters n and t because
neither can be greater than the size of a secret.
3.4.1 Time Complexity
Data sharing and reconstruction complexity of most
SSSs increases with n and t. In practice, n is a little
bigger than t to guarantee data availability. Thus, the
time complexity of sharing data is a little higher than
that of reconstruction, e.g., O(mnt) > O(mt2) in [76].
However, when availability is not enforced, data sharing
and reconstruction complexity is the same.
In contrast, in most MSSSs type I, secret sharing
time complexity is clearly lower than that of data re-
construction, e.g., O ((n+m− t) t) < O(m3) in [94],
because they share several secrets at once but recon-
struct each secret independently.
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Overall, time complexities to share/reconstruct data
by [37] are the lowest: O(max(m, t2)). Execution time
actually depends only on m, because m is large, while
both t and n are small in the normal case (m n ≥ t).
Moreover, VSSSs and VMSSSs must verify the cor-
rectness of keys and/or data. Thus, extra computa-
tion time is required. The time complexity of data/key
verification is generally lower than that of data shar-
ing/reconstruction. Moreover, the time complexity of
key verification is generally lower than that of data veri-
fication. Several schemes achieve the lowest key verifica-
tion complexity: O(t), but only [37] achieves the lowest
data verification complexity: O(n).
3.4.2 Storage Volume
Figure 11 plots the estimated global share volume of
all SSSs with respect to n, with t = n− 1 and original
data volume is 1 GB. [60] is not plotted because global
share volume grows very rapidly (about 252 GB when
n = 7).
Global share volume (GBs)
n
2
4
6
8
3 4 5 6 7
n+ 1: [21]
n: Others
t: [25]
4: [82]
3: [16,19], n− t+ 2: [5]
n/(t− 1): [6]
n/t: [20,54,72,75,80,89]
1: [27,28,37,38,52,78,90,94,99]
Fig. 11: Global share volume comparison
Almost all SSSs require a volume about n times that
of secret data to store shares. Some SSSs propose solu-
tions to minimize share volume. We categorize them
into three classes. First, [54,72,98] split data before
sharing. Hence, share volume is only n/t times that
of secrets. However, since the size of shares decreases
when t increases, the value of t cannot be bigger than
the size of a secret.
Second, global share volumes in [90] and [75,89,20,
80,6] are only 1 and n/t times that of secret data, re-
spectively, because they construct t and n shares, re-
spectively, per data block sizing t secrets.
Third, [37,82,19,16,5] share secrets independently,
but they construct fewer than n shares per secret (1,
4, 3, 3 and n− t+ 2 shares, respectively). Hence, share
volumes are only 1, 4, 3, 3 and n− t+ 2 times that of
secret data, respectively.
Overall, [90,37] require the lowest storage volume
(the same as secret data volume) to store shares. How-
ever, [90] does not support data availability and [37]
supports data availability only when the NB is accessi-
ble. Share volumes of [54,72,80,6,5] are a little higher
than that of the lowest-share-volume approaches [90,37]
if n is close to t, but they do support data availability.
Some SSSs require extra storage to store keys. Most
of them use only n or nt keys to share all secrets. Thus,
they only consume a small storage volume. However,
key volumes of [12,49,25] are greater than the secret
data volume (about t2 [12], 2n [49] and t [25] times data
volume) because they use different key sets to share a
secret. Hence, their overall storage volume (shares, keys
and signatures) are greater than that of other SSSs, and
thus incurs a higher storage cost.
Finally, all VSSSs and VMSSSs require extra stor-
age to store signatures. The number of signatures is
about the number of keys or shares, depending on the
verified data type. Thus, overall signature volume is
lower than share volume in all VSSSs and VMSSSs.
However, if signatures are too small, verification accu-
racy becomes weak.
Overall, [16] requires the lowest storage volume to
store signatures. Hence, its overall storage volume is
lower than n times that of secret data. In contrast, [73,
77] require the greatest storage volume to store signa-
tures. Hence, their overall storage volume turn to be
greater than other SSSs, i.e., the same as [12,49,25],
which construct a huge volume of keys.
4 Frameworks and Architectures for Sharing
Secrets in the Cloud
Secret sharing-based cloud frameworks, such as the ones
proposed by [84,70], are similar to classical data dis-
tribution frameworks [97,69,104] in the cloud and dis-
tribute secrets over nodes at a single CSP’s (Figure 12).
They mostly differ in the SSSs they use. Unlike a classi-
cal data distribution framework, such frameworks guar-
antee data availability by default. Both secret shar-
ing and data reconstruction processes run at a master
server’s (Figure 13). Although the master server may
be a node in the cloud, to reduce privacy breaches in
case of hacking, the master server usually stands at the
user’s side to hide all private parameters and keys from
intruders collecting shares.
Two optional verification processes may be enforced
by VSSSs. The first process helps verify the correctness
of query results at PTs’ so that no erroneous query
results are transferred back to the master server. The
second process runs at the master server’s and verifies
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the correctness of reconstructed query results in case
some PTs are not honest.
However, this framework bears a critical security
weakness. Since all shares are stored at the same CSPs,
if the CSP is hacked, all data can be easily collected
and reconstructed by the intruder.
Single CSP
Node 1
(PT1)
Node 2
(PT2)
• • •
Node n
(PTn)
Node n+ 1
(NB or Index Servers)
*** Optional
Master Server(s)
User
Fig. 12: Architecture from [84,70]
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Fig. 13: Cloud SSS framework
In contrast, the frameworks such as the ones pro-
posed by [6,5,32,63] distribute secrets over multiple
CSPs (Figure 14), thus providing better availability (it
is unlikely that two or more CSPs all fail at the same
time) and privacy (collecting all shares is more difficult
than in the one-CSP case).
As in the previous framework, storage and compu-
tation costs are still high. However, unlike global data
volume, global storage monertary cost might not be n
times that of original data because storage cost dif-
fers from CSP to CSP. In contrast, data access time
is bounded to the slowest CSP. Yet, this problem may
be alleviated by both balancing data access time and
providing the lowest possible costs [5,4].
Finally, an SSSS-based framework [67,66,100,65] gen-
eralizes the first two frameworks by distributing se-
CSP 1
(PT1)
CSP 2
(PT2)
• • •
CSP n
(PTn)
CSPn+ 1
(NB or Index Servers)
*** Optional
Master Server(s)
User
Fig. 14: Architecture from [6,5,32,63]
crets over multiple nodes at multiple CSPs’ (Figure 15).
CSPs play the role of PTs and a number of nodes at
CSPs’ are the weight of PTs (wi). Thus, security is not
limited by the number of CSPs (n), but by the total
number (w =
∑
i wi) of nodes at all CSPs, which can
be large. Moreover, shares stored in nodes at any CSPs
are not enough to reconstruct any secret since wi < t.
w1 nodes at CSP1
(w1 PTs)
• • •
wx nodes at CSPn
(wx PTs)
• • •• • •
CSPn+ 1
(NB or Index Servers)
*** Optional
Master Server(s)
User
Fig. 15: SSSS-based framework [67,66,100,65]
There are some applications, e.g., secure data stor-
age, secure databases and data warehouses, private in-
formation retrieval, and data management in the cloud,
use the above frameworks.
Eventually, let us briefly present query functionality
in secure data storage solutions for public clouds that
use or extend Shamir’s SSS [76]. Low-level data stor-
age [79,32] handle pattern search, equijoins and range
queries on shares. Table 6 summarizes the querying fea-
tures of secure cloud databases and data warehouses
[35,36,86,1,43,88,44,42,6,5,50].
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Table 6: Query types allowed by secret sharing-based
cloud applications
Queries [1] [36] [35,44,43,42] [86] [88] [6,5,50]
Update N N Y Y Y Y
Exact match N Y Y N Y Y
Range N Y Y N Y Y
Aggregate Y Y Y Y N Y
Grouping N N N N N Y
5 Conclusion
In this final section, we first draw a critical overview
of all SSSs surveyed in this paper, including current
challenges when using SSSs and in a cloud computing
context. Finally, we present some sample applications
that can benefit from SSSs.
5.1 Secret Sharing Schemes
Classic SSSs handle data security and availability with
high sharing/reconstruction time and storage costs. MSSSs
share data at once and reduce both costs. In addition,
MSSSs type I support data availability by using a NB,
but are vulnerable if the NB is attacked. Hence, to share
data with MSSSs type I in the cloud, the NB should be
located at a PT’s that guarantees high security and
availability. In contrast, PSSSs and [5] enhance data
privacy by periodically refreshing shares and protect-
ing data from CSP group cheating, respectively.
In addition, VSSSs and VMSSSs can verify the cor-
rectness of either or both of data and keys, but these
operations induce additional time overhead and require
to store signatures in addition to shares. Outer code
verification still necessitates to trust PTs, because it is
done at PTs’. Moreover, since almost all VMSSSs are
also MSSSs type I, their total storage volume (keys,
shares and signatures) is still lower than n times that
of secret data.
Only [80] verifies the correctness of both data and
keys. Although it is an MSSS type II, its total storage
volume is only about twice that of secret data. More-
over, its data sharing complexity is also reasonable, i.e.,
O(mt), while most SSSs have a cubic sharing complex-
ity.
Eventually, only [6,5] verify the correctness of both
data and shares. They also minimize global share vol-
ume to lower than n times that of secret data. Moreover,
[5] can insert new data even though some PTs disap-
pear, i.e., even though some CSPs fail due to technical
or economic reasons.
Moreover, PSSSs refresh shares and verify their cor-
rectness to improve data privacy. However, computa-
tion (to renew shares) and storage (to store signatures)
costs induce extra overhead in the refreshment process.
Communications to synchronous shares from PTs to
PTs are also numerous, thus provoking network bottle-
necks.
Some SSSs support features such as updates, search
operations, aggregation operations, etc. These features
help minimize computation cost at the user’s side and
reduce communication overhead. Only three SSSs [12,
6,5] support all three operation types: update, exact
match and aggregation. However, none can handle com-
posite operations on shares, e.g., simultaneous exact
match and aggregation. Performing composite opera-
tions on shares remains a challenge in SSSs as of today.
Among SSSs that support search and aggregation op-
erations, again only [80,6,5] minimize storage cost. [80]
also optimizes data sharing time.
Finally, [53,20] allow the user to add and remove
PTs to/from the PT pool. In the cloud, users can thus
add and remove CSPs on demand. However, estimating
monetary storage cost and detecting attacks or CSP
failures is difficult. Thus, taking (or worse, automating)
a decision regarding the CSP pool under CSP pricing
or privacy constraints is still an open issue.
5.2 Secure Applications in the Cloud
SSSs addressed various issues over time (Section 2). Let
us describe below some applications that can benefit
from secret sharing for data security.
Textual documents such as emails could be shared
with [12,25,6], since these SSSs optimize cost and up-
date and search performance by allowing updates and
exact matches directly over shares. Moreover, [25,6]
also guarantee data integrity with inner and both inner
and outer code verification, respectively. Finally, only
[6] optimizes both storage volume and data sharing and
reconstruction time.
In databases and data warehouses, update, exact
match and aggregation operators are casually used. To
optimize query response time, such SSSs as [25,6,5] can
be used to leverage cloud databases and warehouses. All
these SSSs indeed guarantee data integrity. Moreover,
[6,5] also optimize storage cost and [5] allows insert-
ing new data although some CSPs fail. Several secret
sharing-based database or warehousing approaches [35,
36,86,1,43,88,44,42,6,5,50] exploit the above-mentioned
SSSs.
To handle data streams, SSSs such as [54,82,19,16]
can be used, because they optimize sharing time and
share secrets independently. Moreover, they require an
overall storage volume that is lower than n times that
of secret data. [54]’s storage volume is even close to the
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secret’s volume if n and t are big and n is close to t.
However, only [82,19,16] guarantee data integrity.
Since memory is still limited in practice, SSSs that
share data at once [94,18,37,99,27,28,52,38,78] cannot
handle big data volumes. However, SSSs that share indi-
vidual secrets [76,12,3,54,71,72,49,46,61,83,73,23,77,
53,98,82,19,21,25,16,5] or data blocks [90,75,20,89,60,
80,6] allow the execution of the sharing process in main
memory or even its parallelization, and thus can share
huge data volumes efficiently.
Finally, potential users of database outsourcing should
be aware that even frameworks based on normally highly
secure SSSs might still be insecure because of inade-
quate architectural choices or a strong tradeoff in fa-
vor of query power [26]. To circumvent this problem,
(V)MSSSs that primarily protect multiple secrets are
a better choice than (V)SSSs for cloud applications. In
any case, users should carefully evaluate the limitation
of target SSSs before using them in any applicative con-
text. We hope this survey will help them for this sake.
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